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INEVITABLE ERRORS: THE PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD
IN CIVIL LITIGATION

James Brook*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Once a trial has begun, the legal system stands committed to deciding the issues of fact that are crucial to the case being tried. Our
society accepts the fact that a verdict must be arrived at even though a
significant amount of uncertainty may exist at the time of decision as to
the correctness of the verdict. The factfinder is not afforded the option,
which might be unavoidably attractive in many cases, of refusing to
decide or even of insisting that more or better evidence be brought to
his attention if he must settle the disputed facts. In a system in which
disputed facts are judged by fallible humans, as opposed to one such as
trial by ordeal which calls upon divine guidance, it is acknowledged
that, even under the best circumstances, errors will occur. That errors
will occur may be inevitable, but it is also exceedingly troubling.
Rules relating to the conduct of trials may be evaluated on the
basis of the level of error that may result from their use. The only rule
that would ensure the absence of errors at trial would be one that outlawed trials altogether. Otherwise, the choice of rules relating to trial
affects and is affected by judgments, conscious or otherwise, regarding
the number and types of errors that will flow from the introduction of a
particular rule. A second matter of concern is how that level and distribution of errors relates generally to other values in the society.
This Article will consider one particular rule relating to the trial
process: The burden of persuasion placed upon litigants in the standard civil trial situation. 1 Generally, in order to prevail, the party with
• Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; B.A., 1968, Harvard University; J.D.,
1972, Harvard University.
1. On the "burden of persuasion" as one of two aspects of what is more generally called the
burden of proof, see James, Burdens oj'Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51 (1961). The term refers to the
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the burden of persuasion must prove his case "by a preponderance of
the evidence" offered at triaP What can it mean to say that this is the
burden placed upon, for example, the plaintiff? At first glance, this
may not seem a particularly tricky question; the standard seems to call
for a simple weighing procedure which is no more subtle than the common sense notion expressed in such ideas as majority rule or seeing the
better person win. The standard is sometimes thought to be only determinative in that rare situation where the case is a dead heat or tie to the
trier of fact. 3
Whatever common sense may say, the meaning to be given this
standard, at least as developed by a number of courts and legal scholars, and what it reveals about how the trial process is to operate is far
from simple. Mter appreciating the complexity of this standard, one
may easily understand why a survey of jurors conducted in 1937 revealed that the proposition of law the jurors reported they had most
difficulty understanding was the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard.4
This Article begins by introducing a particular approach to the
preponderance standard, a method that makes use of some basic
probability theory. Although this model is termed a probability approach, its development involves only the most simple arithmetic and is
neither highly theoretical nor abstract. Understanding the model requires no particular mathematical sophistication and the model, in fact,
has been adopted by a number of courts with no difficulty.s This approach has the virtue of carrying with it a result that serves as its justification since it reduces erroneous verdicts to a minimum. The Article
then reviews criticisms of this model and its alternatives which still
need of the party assigned this burden to convince the factfinder of the truth of his assertion when
the question is ultimately placed before the factfinder for determination.
2. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339, at 793 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. This standard may not be applied in every case; for example, where
the particular jurisdiction requires proof in a class of cases by a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard. See id. § 340.
3. See. e.g., Winter, The Jury and the Risk ofNonpersuasion,5 LAW & SOC'y REV. 335, 339
(1971).
4. Conference Report, Trial by Jury, 11 U. CIN. L. REV. 119, 192 n.IS (1937). While the
Report did not indicate what instruction these jurors were presented with, it is tempting to surmise
that the instruction involved something like the "actual belief in truth" standard, discussed i'!fra,
notes 29-47 and accompanying text. McCormick's classic treatise, after reviewing the confusion
that surrounds the term, concludes that where no pattemjury instruction is available, "trial judges
would be wise to search for the locally accepted phraseology and adhere to it religiously." McCORMICK, supra note 2, § 339, at 796.
5. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, cases cited at 794 n.56.
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have their adherents. In considering these alternatives, a particular
question should be kept in mind: Do they offer convincing reasons for
moving away from an approach which claims to offer a chance to minimize errors?

II. A

PROBABILITY ,ApPROACH

For present purposes and to keep the discussion manageable, suppose that the resolution of a particular case has come down to a single
disputed factual issue, X. 6 In order to win, the plaintiff must satisfy his
burden of persuasion that fact X is true. In other words, there must be
more evidence tending to show that X is true than evidence against this
proposition. The standard is not construed to mean more evidence in a
strictly quantitative sense as in the volume of evidence or the number
of witnesses who have appeared. Rather, the amount of evidence is a
qualitative standard, weighed in terms of its ability to convince. The
standard is translated into a requirement that, based on the totality of
evidence produced, it appears that X is more likely to be true than
false.
Statements made in terms of likelihood lend themselves to explanation and quantification using the theory of probability. The assertion that the probability of a statement being true equals a specific
number is meant to be a measurement of the likelihood that it will tum
out to be true. The number allotted must be between zero and one; the
higher the likelihood, the higher the number. If the probability is given
as zero, then the statement is definitely not true. If the probability is
given as one, the statement is definitely true. To declare that the statement "X is true" is more likely than "X is false" is only to say that the
probability of "X is true" itself being true is greater than that of "X is
false" being true. In other words, it may be said that the probability of
X, denoted P(X), is greater than the probability of not-x.
One more fundamental axiom of the probability calculus can now
be introduced. Two statements are said to be mutually exclusive if they
cannot both be true at the same time. Under all traditional definitions
of probability, the probability that one of two mutually exclusive state6. Even with this admittedly artificial assumption, the problem is difficult enough. An entirely separate set of problems must be faced if we open the question to include the more realistic
situations where a party's case depends on the conjunction of several propositions and inferences
made upon inferences. See Schum, Book Review, 77 MICH. L. REV. 446 (1979); Wagner, Book
Review, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1071.
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ments will be true is equal to the sum of their individual probabilities.
That is, if A and B are mutually exclusive, then
peA or B) = peA) + PCB).
In the present case, X and not-X are mutually exclusive since a
statement cannot be both true and false. Furthermore, P(X or not-X)
must equal one. It is certain that either X will be true or it will be false.
It follows from this assumption that
I = P(X) + P(Not-X).
Looking at this equation, it is obvious that the statement that X is more
probable than not-X is equivalent to saying that P(X) is greater than .5.
With this relatively simple derivation, the description of plaintiffs
burden has been translated to the showing that P(X) is greater than .5.
T.his interpretation of the preponderance standard is frequently relied
upon by the courts.7 But how is such a requirement to be understood?
Typically statements are considered either true or false. What interpretation or meaning can be given to the probability of a statement's truth?
The most commonly given interpretation of this type of measure describes the probability in terms of the relative frequency, the proportion
of times, that the statement would be true over a long series of identical
experiments or investigations. For example, the probability that a single fair throw of a fair die will show a four is equal to one-sixth, because over many throws of the die it is believed that one-sixth of them
will turn up a four. Similarly, it might be said that the probability is
one-eighth that a single law student chosen at random will be lefthanded, because, out of numerous random choices, one-eighth of the
selections would result in a student displaying this characteristic. This
interpretation could also follow from the fact that one-eighth of all of
the students in law school were left-handed, provided the choosing
could actually be done randomly every time. 8
An occasionally raised argument against applying even the simplest probability notion to legal factfinding is a conception, or rather a
misconception, that probability statements make sense only when made
about a future event. Legal factfinding usually concerns itself with
what has already happened and probability theory is thought to be irrelevant to such questions. At one point, this notion had even received
7. See supra note 5.
8. For a more thorough explanation of the relative frequency concept of probability and of
the "subjectivist" approach which follows il!fra, notes 11-15 and accompanying text, see Cullison,
Probability Ana{ysis 0/" Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline o/"the Subjective Approach,
1969 U. TOL. L. REv. 538, 538-63.
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support from the New York Court of Appeals when it rejected the introduction of probabilistic evidence relevant to a past event, explaining
that "[t]he fact to be established in this case was not the probability of a
future event, but whether an occurrence asserted by the people to have
happened had actually taken place."9
This rejection of the use of probabijity statements to apply to uncertain past events, however, does not hold up to scrutiny, and more
recent writers are in agreement that it need not stand in the way of the
use of probability analysis at trial. lO The probability that a die already
thrown, but unseen, has come up a four is the same as the probability
that the die will come up a four when next thrown. Similarly, the
probability that a given law student already chosen at random will turn
out to be left-handed when asked is equal to the probability that a student yet to be chosen at random will have this characteristic.
A more serious problem with applying the relative frequency
probability concept in trial is that for the typical factual issue, unlike
the examples just given, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize
what a large number of identical trials would mean. One can conceive
of a large number of identical experiments tossing a die or choosing a
single student at random. However, it hardly makes sense to speak of
the proportion of times one expects to find X true in a large number of
identical cases involving the same parties and complex situation. Legal
decisionmaking deals with events that are not only in actuality unique
(every throw of a die is unique), but also conceptually unique so that
the frequency interpretation of probability statements cannot comfortably be applied to them.
In such situations, a second interpretive theory of probability, distinct from the frequency interpretation, seems more appropriate. 11 The
formulation of what are referred to as "subjective" or "personal"
probabilities rests on the notion that an individual's statements such as
"P(X) = C," where C is some number between 0 and 1, can be under9. People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75, 86, 108 N.E. 200, 203 (1915). This case is discussed in
Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329,
1344-45 (1971).
10. M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 62-63 (1978); Tribe, supra note 9, at
1344-45.
II. Iversen, Operationalizing the Concept of Probability in Legal-Social Science Research, 5
LAW & SOC'y REv. 331 (1971); Kaplan, .Decision Theory and the Fac(/inding Process, 20 STAN. L.
REv. 1065, 1066-67 (1968). While the basic idea behind subjective probability has apparently
existed for a long time, the rigorous development of the concept is relatively recent, occurring
within the past sixty years. See Kaye, TIre Laws ofProbability and the Law ofthe Land, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 34, 42 n.31 (1979).
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stood as stating the speaker's degree of belief in X's truth. This in tum
is reflected in his willingness to place a bet on the proposition or,
rather, his response to different wagers offered to him. So, for example,
a person indifferent to taking either side of a bet regarding a statement's truth, when offered five-to-one odds, is said to possess a subjective probability of one-sixth that the statement is true. If he favors one
side or the other of this offered bet even slightly, his subjective
probability is said to be either higher or lower than one-sixth. There
are various formulations of subjective probability theory and each
could be developed in far more detail than here. However, for present
purposes, it suffices to state that a trier would have a subjective
probability of greater than .5 that X is true if he would choose to bet
that way when instructed to pick one side of an even money bet about
X.12

Subjective probabilities depend, of course, on the individual making the probability statement. However, it can be shown that everyone
obeys all of the conventional rules of probability theory as long as it is
postulated that the decisionmaker displays some characteristics of rational behavior, in the sense of utility or profit maximization. The decisionmaker must be consistent in assigning probabilities and the
probabilities assigned to X and not-X must obey the rule:
P(X) + P(not-X) = I
If these factors are not met, it can be shown that, by a careful choice of
bets against him, the decisionmaker can be turned into' a "money
pump" in favor of one side or the other. 13 It may also be supposed,
although subject to somewhat more debate, that the "subjectivist" decisionmaker would turn "objectivist" on any occasion when an objective
relative frequency probability estimate can be made and is available to
him. That is, the decisionmaker might be required to give a subjective
12. It should be noted that as the notion is developed, the person whose statement of subjective probability is being considered is put in a position where he must choose one side or the otherj
he cannot simply sit out the game. This becomes important when the concept is applied to the
legal factfinder.
If it seems somewhat oppressive to demand a choice, even in this metaphorical sense, a more
rigorous development of the subjective interpretation would avoid this impression. Thus, the individual's choice could be arranged as one where he can only win. He might be asked whether he
would prefer the chance to get a wonderful gift if the proposition X turns out to be true or the
chance to get the same gift if X turns out to be false. In such an instance, he would have no reason
not to choose and to do the best he could.
As an example in a nonlegal context of a probability statement which makes sense only under
the subjective interpretation, consider the statement, "I'd say there's a five percent probability that
the Mets will make the World Series this year."
13. Kaye, supra note II, at 43 n.32.
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probability of exactly one-sixth to the possibility of a fair die turning
up a four following a fair throw, for example, if he is to be considered
rational, or at least someone whose decisions are worthy of our attention and respect. 14
Such a formulation of the preponderance of the evidence standard
calls for the trier of fact to find for the plaintiff if and only if the
probability of the plaintiff's assertion about the fact in dispute is greater
than .5. It is appropriate and necessary to ask what justification exists
for using this particular decision rule or, in fact, for using any rule
under the banner of "the preponderance of the evidence." It could be
argued that this type of rule and particularly the choice of the .5 benchmark are unavoidable. If one chose a point below .5, victory would
clearly be given to the weaker of two cases, and to pick any number
greater than .5 but less than 1.0, since certainty cannot be required,
would be an "arbitrary" selection, since no natural or obvious
breakpoint exists between the two numbers. 15
Other litigation decisions, however, are made under rules calling
for proof "by clear and convincing evidence" or "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Both of these standards call for some kind of evaluation in this
realm of greater probabilities, even if the measure may not be exactly
quantified. In fact, in the case of the criminal standard, it is generally
thought to be appropriate that no particular mathematical measure is
set forth. It might be suggested that the reason the ordinary civil standard is lower and more easily met than the other two is that decisions
to be made under the former standards are generally less important
and of less consequence than other litigation. 16 This generalization
hardly seems convincing, given a world of multi-million dollar civil
suits.
A more satisfactory explanation for the appropriateness of the preponderance standard in of(:l~ary civil suits is that it appears to treat the
two parties to the litigation equally. To do otherwise would be to take
sides unfairly, to impose a burden on one party not imposed on the
other. This argument that the standard is the only "fair" one under the
14. Id. at 44 n.35; Tribe, supra note 9, at 1348. Of course, a rational person might have
reasons to suspect that a given die or a given throw is not "fair" and that hence the probability of a
particular number appearing would not be one-sixth. That is why it is critical to stipulate that a
fair situation exists. The fact that the probability estimate may be different given more information is a feature of both the frequency and subjective interpretations. See i'!fra note 57 for a
discussion of Bayes' Theorem.
IS. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 66.
16. See Jackson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., III N.J.L. 487, -, 170 A. 22, 23-24 (1933).
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circumstances has great intuitive appeal and seems, until recently, to
have been unquestioned. I7 Toward the conclusion of this Article, however, a recent analysis, suggesting that the question of "fairness" may
be more complex than is first imagined, will be explored. Consideration will be given to Professor Finkelstein's contention that, despite all
its virtues, this decision standard may not tr~at the parties equally in
one respect; it may well result in more erroneous decisions going
against one party than the other.
The principal argument given today as justification for the ".5 or
better" rule, at least in academic circles, is one that might not be intuitively apparent. It can be demonstrated that this rule is the one which
must be adopted if the decisionmaker's goal is to minimize the absolute
number of total errors which will arise from the course of decisions in
the long run.I8 Assuming that the plaintiff and defendant dispute only
the truth of a single proposition, X, then the total number of instances
in which either the plaintiff or the defendant is denied a verdict erroneously will be minimized if the verdict is granted to the plaintiff if and
only if he has shown the probability of X being true to exceed, even by
the smallest measure, .5. The argument for adoption of such a rule,
which promises to minimize errors, is obvious. If one assumes that the
disutility of an erroneous verdict in a civil suit is the same whether that
verdict incorrectly goes against a plaintiff or a defendant,19 arriving at
the desirability of the rule, minimizing total errors, seems to follow
from the most simple rule, utilitarian calculus,zo
17. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 65-66; Winter, supra note 3, at 337.
18. Ball, TIre Moment ofTruth: Probability Theory and Standards ofProof, 14 V AND. L. REV.
807,822-23 (1961); Cullison, supra note 8, at 569; Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1021, 1033-34 (1977). For the most general mathematical proof in this area, see Kaye, Book Review, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 605 n.19 (1980).
19. This assumption seems compelled either by the practical difficulties of arriving at any
alternative figures worthy of confidence or by an affirmative belief that to hold otherwise would
introduce an unacceptable bias into the trial process. See M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 67;
Kaye, TIre Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 103; Lempert,
supra note 18, at 1033-34. But see Kaplan, supra note II, at 1072.
20. On the utility calculation in this situation, see Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa
LoqUitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1467 n.43 (1979). Making the decision one of utility also explains why the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is so very different from the civil
standard. It is not because criminal cases are generally "more important" than civil cases, but
rather that in the criminal situation the disutilities of the two different types of errors are clearly
not identical The disutility of the erroneous conviction of an innocent person is thought to be far
greater than the disutility of an erroneous acquittal of a guilty one.
Most authorities translate the justification for the rule from the minimization of errors to the
maximization of utility, but one should not have to be a utilitarian to find much appeal in the rule
of greater than .5. Whatever ethical theory one holds to be important, it seems that erroneous
verdicts must be regarded as undesirable and to be avoided, all other things being equal, as often
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CASES

At this point, the lengthy development of the preponderance standard, culminating in a rule stated in terms of a probability of .5 or
greater, may seem to have been a great labor to very little effect. One
may easily believe this endeavor has been merely a matter of restating
the obvious and taking pains to restate it in what is, for many, the more
difficult form of a probability statement. The actual result may seem
uncontroversial and unassailable. But this is not the case. The ".5 or
greater" interpretation of the preponderance standard is far from universally adopted,21 and has been the subject of much criticism.
As an introduction to the opposing views, consider two cases, both
decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the 1940's,
which appear to have brought this debate to the surface and are currently considered central to any discussion of the topic. The situations
they present read almost like the hypotheticals one would have to invent for purposes of discussion were they not already available.
Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co. 22 involved a suit brought by
the beneficiary of an accident insurance policy issued to the beneficiary's son, Upham Sargent, "a young man of twenty-one, financially
comfortable, mentally well-balanced, vigorous, athletic, resourceful,
courageous, a good swimmer, and of some experience in living in wild
country without provisions."23 Despite these attributes, Sargent never
returned from a particularly adventurous journey, an attempt to direct
a kayak down the treacherous Nottaway River of Northwest Quebec.
The insured was last seen on September 8, 1934. In subsequent
months, his paddle and a part of his kayak were found, but no other
evidence of what happened to Upham Sargent was ever discovered.
The terms of the insurance policy on which a claim was brought covered death due solely to accident. Thus, the case depended on whether
the plaintiff had proved by a preponderance of the evidence, which included that presented above along with other information attesting to
the foolhardiness of attempting to take a kayak down the Nottaway,
that the insured died from an accident within the terms of the policy.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant insurance comas possible. The question, in any event, becomes what other values society wants to be weighed'
against the strong appeal of the error minimizing rule.
21. "Some courts have boldly accepted this view." MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 794.
22. 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940).
23. Id. at 247, 29 N.E.2d at 826.
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pany.24 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in setting aside
the verdict and entering a judgment for the plaintiff, presented its own
version of the preponderance standard.
The burden of proof that is on the plaintiff in this case
does not require him to establish beyond all doubt, or beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the insured died from accidental injury within the policy. He must prove that by a preponderance of the evidence. It has been held not enough that
mathematically the chances somewhat favor a proposition to
be proved; for example, the fact that colored automobiles
made in the current year outnumber black ones would not
warrant a finding that an undescribed automobile of a current
year is colored and not black, nor would the fact that only a
minority of men die of cancer warrant a findmg that a particular man did not die of cancer. . . . The weight or ponderance of evidence is its power to convince the tribunal which
has the determination of the fact, of the actual truth of the
proposition to be proved. After the evidence has been
weighed, that proposition is proved by a preponderance of the
evidence if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the
sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence,
exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding
any doubts that may still linger there. . . .
Upon the evidence, in the opinion of a majority of the
court, a jury could find, not merely that there was a greater
chance that the insured met his death by accident falling
within the policy than that he met a different fate, but that
death by accident within the policy was in fact indicated by a
preponderance of the evidence.25
The second case, Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc. ,26 involved a far less
romantic journey, that of Betty Smith driving her automobile down
Main Street in Winthrop, Massachusetts. While on this ride, she was
forced off the road and into a parked car by a bus, which she described
only as a "great big, long, wide affair."27 In her suit, she apparently
only offered evidence that the defendant company was the sole bus operator authorized by the department of public utilities to operate on
that street, although private or chartered buses were not precluded
from using it. Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court, quoting at
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 246, 29 N.E.2d at 825.
Id. at 250-51,29 N.E.2d at 827 (citations omitted).
317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945).
Id. at 469, 58 N.E.2d at 754.
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length from Sargent, overruled exceptions to a verdict directed for the
defendant, stating, "The most that can be said of the evidence in the
instant case is that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor
the proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident . . .
[and] this was not enough."28
The opinions in these cases point to two general themes of importance to this discussion. First, it has been argued that the preponderance standard requires that the factfinder do more than arrive at a
conclusion about the relative likelihood of the truth of the plaintiffs
contentions. He must act only on the "actual belief in its truth," a concept which is the subject of the next section of this Article. Next, a
distinct question suggested by the cases and much argued since must be
considered. Neither case contained an offer of general statistical evidence to bolster the plaintiffs case, such as, in Smith, the proportion of
all buses going down Main Street operated by the defendant company.
Nevertheless, the opinions are construed to support the proposition that
such evidence could never be regarded as sufficient to meet the preponderance standard. It is contended that no party can meet his burden
only on what is referred to as background statistical evidence and that a
minimum of particularized or individualized evidence is always required. This issue presents a question not necessarily of how "high" a
standard is called for, but of what type of evidence can be permitted to
meet the standard.
IV.

"ACTUAL BELIEF IN TRUTH"

Perhaps the most forceful argument in favor of an interpretation
of the preponderance standard instructing the factfinder to reach a decision based only on his "actual belief' as to the truth of contested facts
is found in a 1906 article by William Trickett.29 The author first considers the rule which he finds in the then current authorities, much to
his dissatisfaction, to be the preponderance of probabilities rule. Trickett observed the following:
A corollary from this rule would be that the juror or the judge
must in many cases decide in favor of A or B, the parties to
the suit, that a fact did or did not occur, although he does not
believe that it occurred or did not occur.
. . . [T]o believe that there is this greater degree of evi28. Id. at 470, 58 N.E.2d at 755.
29. Trickett, Preponderance of Evidence, And Reasonable Doubt, 10

FORUM

75 (1906).
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dence of occurrence than of non-occurrence, is not to believe
the occurrence, rather than the non-occurrence. 30
These rather cryptic comments are given some substance by a hypothetical case Trickett presents. He proposes that party A sues party B
on a note, the execution of which B denies, and that the two gather up
teams of witnesses to testify on the issue of whether or not the signature
is in B's handwriting. First, six witnesses testify in A's favor while only
five testify for B. No difference appears in the credibility of any of the
witnesses involved. Trickett concludes that, while any prudent and
sensible person would remain in a state of doubt, neither believing nor
disbelieving that B had signed the note, the "ordinary man, juror or
judge" would be compelled by the preponderance criterion to find for
A in a court oflaw.31 With this reading in mind, no wonder he argues
that:
The rule indicated results in palpable absurdity. The object of the law is, or ought to be, to secure the sequence of
certain results upon certain objective facts. If B signed the
note he ought to be compelled to pay it. It would be, of
course, inadmissible to hold that the absolute certainty of the
jury that he signed it, should be the preliminary to this compulsion. But would it be too much to hold that the jury
should believe, at least in some low degree, that he signed it?
Is not the principle abhorrent that B may be coerced into paying a sum of money to A, when the jury does not believe, even
in a faint degree, that he promised to pay it, simply because it
believes that, of the plaintiff's and defendant's respective
pieces of evidence, that of the former is heavier than that of
the latter?32
It seems clear that Trickett's objection to the preponderance rule,
as he interprets it, is premised on the belief that "weighing the evidence" somehow commits the trier of fact to reach a result rigidly
based on the number of witnesses or the gross volume of evidence. Perhaps this conclusion was prompted by the absence, at the time, of a
well developed treatment of what has been called the subjective interpretation of probability statements. Still, this is hardly a reading of the
preponderance standard, or even of the word "evidence," that commends itself to common sense. But, even though later authorities clarified the fact that the preponderance standard contemplates evidence as
30. Id. at 77-78.
31. Id. at 77.
32. Id. at 78.
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measured by its ability to persuade, and not by its sheer bulk, they still
find appeal in Trickett's idea.33 There continues to be a contention that
"belief' is a separate and distinct goal, which the factfinder is bound by
duty to aspire to. So, in 1944, Professor McBaine condemned the notion that the jury should be instructed only to consider whether the
plaintiffs evidence "is stronger or more convincing than the evidence
supporting his opponent's assertions."34 This argument is based on
what initially appears to be a very appealing proposition.
No prudent man would act as to a matter of importance
to him if, after talking with several of his acquaintances, his
state of mind is: "I think 1 will make this investment since
what I have heard favorable to it impresses me more than
what 1 have heard against it." People of prudence do not take
important action involving their self interests when they know
no more than that the evidence for taking an important step is
stronger for taking it than it is for not taking it. Before acting
they entertain stronger convictions.35
Unfortunately, if the prudent man thinks he is avoiding a decision by
declining to invest under the circumstances, he operates under the
crudest form of self-delusion. The choice not to buy is, in itself, a decision. Such a decision certainly will have consequences, as would a decision to invest. The identical situation confronts the factfinder at trial.
As was noted earlier, the decision facing a jury is not whether to decide,
for they are committed to that by their role. Rather it is how to decide
which of two alternatives, a verdict for the plaintiff or for the defendant, shall be the outcome. This decision must be faced strictly on the
basis of information then available.
Trickett and McBaine do not appear, by asking that the jury's goal
be a "stronger conviction," to be arguing simply for a higher standard
of proof in the quantitative sense. It is doubtful that they would be any
more satisfied with a rule requiring a probability of greater than .6 or
33. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940); James, supra note 1, at 53. For cases,
in addition to Sargent, adopting the "actual belief' formulation, see MCCORMICK, supra note 2,
§ 339, at 795 n.S7.
While the author did not undertake a survey of the law of other common law jurisdictions, it
appears that a view similar to the American "actual belief' position has had its adherents and
found its way into cases, at least in England and Australia. R. EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, PROOF
AND PROBABILITY 106-07, 109-11 (1978).
34. McBaine, Burden of Proofi ])egrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 248 (1944). The
author's position seems to be confused. Toward the end of the article, when he offers recommendations for pattern jury instructions, his statement of the preponderance standard drops any reference to "actual belief in truth." Id. at 261-62.
3S. ld. at 248.
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.75. These scholars seem to be calling for what they perceive as a different kind of decisionmaking in the qualitative sense. The problem is
that what they seek may be unobtainable in reality. It may soothe the
conscience of everyone if courtroom controversies were decided and
pronouncements made only on the basis of what is held to be "actual
belief' in their wisdom. This practice certainly appears.more appropriate than that of relying on the best guess in even the most important
situations. But like the prudent investor, the conscientious juror is enmeshed in a difficult position from which he has no easy escape. Uncertainty makes educated guessers of everyone.
More recent commentators have criticized the belief-in-truth argument,36 and it is tempting to regard it as nothing more than an aberration not worthy of serious consideration. 37 But the idea expressed by
those earlier writers does not appear to be entirely a thing of the past.
Recent writings by one British philosopher of science, as well as a few
legal academicians building on his work,38 have advanced the thesis
that traditional probability theory, however formulated, is somehow inappropriate when applied to legal factfinding.
An entirely new, rather startling, formulation of probability has
been advanced, the centerpiece of which seems to be abandoning the
principle of additivity, the requirement that peA) and P(not-A) must
always equal one for any statement A. 39 This novel theory has been
subjected to criticism from the outset.40 The ensuing debate reaches
such heights of theoretical abstraction in the theory of probability and
formal logic that it is difficult to know what to make of it. What is
noteworthy in the present context is that when the arguments finally
touch ground and are applied to the trial process, the results of this
36. See Ball, supra note 18; Cullison, supra note 8.
37. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 65.
38. L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977); Brilmayer & Kornhauser. Review:
Quantitative Methods and Legal .Decisions. 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116 (1978).
39. As discussed in Kaye, supra note 11. at 36-38. Cohen apparently considers the notion that
the probability of a defendant's liability and the probability of his non-liability must equal one to
be "paradoxical" in some way.
Suppose the threshold of proof in civil cases were judicially interpreted as being at the
level of a mathematical probability of .501. Would not judges thereby imply acceptance
of a system in which the mathematical probability that the unsuccessful litigant deserved
to succeed might sometimes be as high at .499? This hardly seems the right spirit in
which to administer justice.
L. COHEN, supra note 38. at 75.
40. See Birmingham, Remarks on 'Probability' in Law: Mostly, A Casenote and A Book Review, 12 GA. L. REV. 535. 544-51 (1978); Kaye, supra note 11; Kaye, supra note 19; Schum. Slpra
note 6; Wagner, supra note 6.
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highly sophisticated and technical criticism sound strangely familiar.
Thus, Professors Brilmayer and Kornhauser in a recent article, based
heavily on this modem non-traditional theory of probability, conclude
that "[i]t seems implausible to assume, however, that when we have
little or no evidence about the truth or falsity of a statement we must be
more than half sure that it is true, or else more than half sure that it is
false."41 Is this anything more than the wishful thinking of earlier writers? What is the careful juror, who is trapped after all in the jury box
and not in the lecture room, to do? The authors suggest that the rational decisionmaker, faced with so little information that '!Jelief in
nothing seems possible, should not give up all hope.
He may then decide to introspect more carefully, consider
gathering more information about the likelihood of A and
not-A, or make a decision based on some criterion distinct
from maximizing expected value. Each of these three tactics
may present complex, unsolved intellectual problems for the
decisionmaker, but it is not obvious why, in adopting one of
them, he would be acting irrationally. One rational strategy
that does not fit the Bayesian [subjectivist] model is a court's
finding of "insufficient evidence," that is, that a party simply
has not adduced sufficient evidence to warrant disturbing the
status-quo. That the Bayesian system does not adequately account for a conception such as "sufficient evidence" becomes
clear ugon examining the premise of additivity at greater
length. 2
How realistic is this advice, given the position the jury member is in?
The authors suggest greater introspection, which is always a good idea
but hardly guaranteed to lead out of any quandary, or even to make it
more tractable. The second alternative suggested, that the jury "consider gathering more information," directly contradicts the trial process. Disputed facts must be decided by the jury during the process and
on the basis of the information presented.43 The value found in the
trial process of simply reaching a conclusion, of settling disputes decisively and for all time, is well accepted and the authors offer no argument that such a fundamental feature of the process should be
abandoned. They suggest, finally, that a decisionmaker has the option
to "make a decision based on some criterion distinct from maximizing
expected value," but provide no hint as to what other values might be
41. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 142 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id.
43. See Kaye, supra note 11, at 47.
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considered nor as to why such an approach would be at all appropriate
or desirable in the trial context.
More curious still is the authors' reference to a court's finding of
"insufficient evidence" in a context which suggests they believe themselves to be describing present practice and not arguing for a new legal
order. This phrase is explained in a civil case as the finding "that the
plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of proof."44 Indeed, in this situation, it can be stated that the plaintiff has produced "insufficient evidence" for his purposes, but it is hardly the case that the jury has acted
on a belief that there was not sufficient evidence before them to arrive
at a verdict. A verdict has been reached and it is definitely not one
which preserves the status quo as the authors contend, at least if the
doctrine of res judicata is recognized. The plaintiff has not only failed
to get an order for relief from the defendant, but he has forever lost his
chance to try again. This is indeed different from the pre-trial position
as any plaintiff who has turned down a healthy settlement offer only to
have a jury verdict go against him would clearly agree. The authors
may wish to argue for a quite different legal order in which a jury, or
the court acting on the law, could justifiably refuse to make a decision
because the evidence offered is insufficient to create "actual belief' in
either the plaintiffs or the defendant's contention. Such a refusal
would leave both parties with undiminished rights; in particular, the
right to try again. But, if this is their interest, they must justify such a
significant reordering on the grounds of the specific values it would
promote and not simply on the difficulty, under current rules, of reaching a decision. Moreover, they would have to take account of the particular problem, in such an order, of compensating for the loss in the
value of a trial as an effective method of dispute resolution producing a
conclusive result. Even under the present system, it would seem one of
the least desirable outcomes, especially to the litigants, is a mistrial with
its prospect' of going through the whole exercise all over again.
It seems the early exponents of the actual-belief-in-truth concept
regarded it as actually a way of increasing accuracy and limiting the
number of errors. This belief, however, cannot be true, at least if the
resultant standard deviates from one calling only for a decision based
on the preponderance of the probabilities.4s Most authorities now con44. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, S/lpra note 38, at 142 n.94.
45. At another point in their article, Professors Brilmayer and Kornhauser appear to accept
the greater than .5 rule, though they refer to the "degree of belief of .5 or greater" as "probably"
satisfying the preponderance standard. Id. at 139-40. It is unclear if this is an inconsistency on
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elude that a jury instructed to find an "actual belief' before making a
finding for the plaintiff, to the extent that the jury pays attention to the
instruction at all, will act only when the subjective probability attained
is substantially greater than .5.46 Any argument for this result which
increases the expected number of errors should be based on the articulation of and the commitment to other distinct values which it could be
expected to further.
Lengthy quotes from the proponents of this position have been
presented in an attempt to decipher the exact purpose these authors
believe the actual-belief-in-truth requirement is designed to serve.
What value does the requirement enhance that might possibly offset the
increased number of errors that would be expected to follow from its
adoption? To a great extent, these passages display a form of denial;
namely, a denial that decisions have to be made and under conditions
that are far from ideal. Beyond this, however, lies something much
more complex. There exists the idea of a separate and independent
value in having a judicial system that is seen, by the members of the
community asked to serve as jurors and by the community at large
which is expected to respect the outcomes of the system, to make decisions premised only upon the basis of "truth" and of "actual belief'
and nothing else. Even if it is recognized that the best trial process will
inevitably result in decisions involving great doubt and in fact some
finite number of truly erroneous decisions, there is a good to be served,
it is argued, by a rule which presents a different face to the outside
world.47
This notion is not as far-fetched as it may first appear. Certainly,
it is adhered to extensively in the criminal law area, but is it an idea
their part or if it may be viewed as consistent upon realizing that the authors seem to favor a form
of probability in which P(X) =.5 would be a harder standard to meet than it would be under any
traditional theory of probability which accepts the additivity axiom.
46. Cullison, supra note 8, at 571. McCormick indicates that the actual-belief-in-truth rule
seems equivalent to the "clear, strong and convincing proof" standard "hitherto thought to be
appropriate only in exceptional cases." MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 795.
There is some empirical evidence to suggest that jurors told to decide by "a preponderance of
the evidence" and nothing more may in effect translate this into a requirement substantially above
.5. Simon & Mahan, Quantflying Burdens ofProof, 5 LAW & SOC'y REv. 319 (1971), report that a
group of jurors questioned by the authors translated the preponderance standard into something
like a need for a probability of .75 or greater. A group of judges, on the other hand, interpreted it
as calling only for a probability of .55. Id. at 325. The result in the case of the jurors is open to
criticism, however, as the question presented to them involved criminal law. In fact, they were
asked at what probability they would "convict" the defendant. Id. Posing the question in this
manner could have easily distorted the jurors' understanding of the standard.
47. For criticism of this notion, see Cullison, supra note 8, at 572-76.
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which carries much weight in civil litigation? This may be, in the end,
an empirical question. Would potential jurors be less willing to serve,
or would they suffer some negative emotional consequence from having served, if the court asked them to take a measure of responsibility
for decisions made even when "actual belief' does not exist? Would
the public respect less decisions made by a system that only balanced
probabilities and made no requirement that the factfinder be willing to
state an "actual belief' in anything? The concept of "actual belief'
being explored is obviously not a probabilistic or statistical concept. It
is essentially a cultural or psychological question of when an individual
is prepared, short of absolute certainty, to tum his innermost thoughts
into a statement of "I believe" on which others may judge both that of
which he speaks as well as him personally.
The arguments in favor of the actual-belief-in-truth standard apparently require that consideration and importance be granted to the
appearance and public perception of the judicial process. Attention is
to be given to the process independent of the results in any single case
or set of cases. Consideration of such factors, however, does not require acceptance of the "actual belief' standard. However, such consideration serves to introduce a set of concerns which have not been
dealt with up to this point. The next section of this Article returns to
such questions with the advantage of a previous thoughtful analysis
which acknowledges that the choice of a rule may require a willingness
to accept a greater level of errors in return for furthering other important values and which attempts to offer some guidance as to what alternative values may be.

v.

PURELY STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

The Smith 48 case, where a driver brought suit against a bus company claiming that its bus ran her off the road, provides a starting point
for this discussion. In the actual case, the plaintiff offered no statistical
evidence. Imagine that she had, however, offered evidence which established that during the period in question four of every five buses
travelling down Main Street were owned by the defendant company.
Suppose further that this were the only evidence presented by the
plaintiff relative to the identity of the owner of the bus. If the identity
of the owner of the bus were the only issue of fact in the case, how
48. Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945). Seesupra notes 26·28
and accompanying text.
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should the trial proceed? Would the defendant be entitled to a directed
verdict because the plaintiff had offered no "individualized" evidence
about the owner of the bus in this case? Or, assuming that the defend~
ant presented no evidence on this issue, would the plaintiff have been
entitled to a directed verdict, since she had shown ''by a preponderance
of the evidence" that the bus was owned by the defendant? Or is it just
a factual question for the jury, in which case one may well ask how the
jury may apply the preponderance standard.
This hypothetical on the use of mathematically expressed background evidence is only one of a large number considered by Professor
Tribe in his well~known article discussing the phenomenon which he
terms "trial by mathematics."49 Tribe's article covers many particular
instances of the legal use of mathematical evidence and theory, but the
overall purpose of his piece is to counter what he perceived, while writing in 1971, as the growing trend, at least in academic literature, towards a belief that mathematically described evidence and math~
ematical techniques of analysis should play a greater role in legal
factfinding and in the analysis oflegal rules. 50 Tribe presents a variety
of arguments against the use of mathematics at trial, most of which rest
on the proposition that the use of such evidence will too often lead to
its inevitable misuse. "[T]he very mystery that surrounds mathematical
arguments-the relative obscurity that makes them at once impenetra~
ble by the layman and impressive to him---creates a continuing risk
that he will give such arguments a credence they may not deserve and a
weight they cannot logically claim."51 So, for example, Tribe asserts
that the jury, which has received quantified evidence as well as other
"soft" or impressionistic evidence, will tend to be overly impressed and
influenced by the former merely because it seems precise, scientific, and
objective. 52
In a recent critique of this article, Professors Saks and Kidd, both
psychologists, argue that Tribe's arguments are based only on his personal assumptions about how well a lay jury can utilize such information and that his assumptions, when compared to the results of
49. Tribe, supra note 9.
50. Id. at 1329-32. Tribe stated that he wrote his article "in reaction to a growing and bewildering literature of praise for mathematical precision in the trial process, a literature that has
tended to catalogue or to assume the virtues of mathematical approaches quite as uncritically as
earlier writers tended to deny their relevance." Id. at 1332 (footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 1334.
52. Id. at 1358-60.
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empirical studies of human decisionmaking, are clearly inaccurate. 53
In particular, they review findings that indicate that most people, when
confronted with background statistical information in addition to case~
specific information, tend to undervalue, not overvalue, the back~
ground information. 54 Contrary to Tribe's assumption, individuals do
not tend to be overly impressed with statistical information, such as the
percentage of buses in the hypothetical. If anything, they give it too
little attention. As damaging as these empirical findings may be to
many of Tribe's arguments, his position is not necessarily completely
untenable. Tribe clearly states, throughout his work, that his concern
with the use of mathematics at trial is not only that it may increase the
number of erroneous verdicts, but that even if it were to decrease the
number of expected errors, there are other reasons to avoid the use of
mathematics. He contends that a trial must be considered not only as a
means to an end, but as an important social event in itself having "rit~
ual" value. 55
Before further exploration of this argument, consider Tribe's view
of the bus hypothetical discussed earlier. What should be done when
only background statistical evidence is presented by the plaintiff?
Tribe correctly asserted that this need not necessarily lead to a directed
verdict for the plaintiff. It will not even have to be true that a rational
and sensible jury would have to find for Mrs. Smith, since by the time
the trial ends, more information will be known. Certain background
statistical evidence which points the finger at the defendant has been
introduced, but the plaintiff failed to introduce any other evidence on
point. Such information in itself may be regarded as highly relevant.
Ifit truly was the defendant's bus that was to blame, why was the plaintiff not able to get any other evidence to bolster her case? "[A]bsent
satisfactory explanation"56 of the plaintiffs failure to come forward
53. Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, IS
& Soe'y REv. 123 (1981).

LAW

. Influential as Tribe's paper has been, like much legal scholarship, it is a Swiss
cheese of assumptions about human behavior-in this case human decision-making
processes-which are asserted as true simply because they fall within the wide reach of
the merely plaUsible, not because any evidence is adduced on their behalf.
Id. at 125 (footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 126-31.
55. See i'!fra, textual discussion beginning at note 60.
56. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1349. See also Kaye, supra note 19, at 106-08. Of course, the
reasoning behind this argument may be a bit circular. If the rule of law were that the plaintiff
could satisfy her initial burden of production by offering statistical evidence alone, then the fact
that she offered no additional evidentiary support might not be "suspicious." It might signify only
that she did not waste her resources gathering up more and better information when she had
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with anything more than the general eighty percent figure, one may
conclude that one's subjective probability that the defendant company's bus was responsible is far lower than .8 and even lower than .5.
It is important to note that such arguments do not signal, in any
way, a difficulty with statistical evidence or probability theory. The
probability that any statement is true wijl. always be subject to change
when new relevant information is available. If it is believed, or there
exists some way of showing, that a given bit of information is more
likely to be true if the defendant's bus were not involved than if it were,
this should indeed make the probability estimate that it was defendant's bus decrease. Probability theory does more than merely conflict
with this intuitive notion. It actually provides a mechanism, known as
Bayes' Theorem, for quantifying the effect of such additional information. 57 Assume that, based on the statistical evidence offered, one initially believes there is an .8 chance that the defendant's bus was
responsible for the mishap. Surprisingly, no additional evidence is
presented regarding ownership of the bus; it seems six times as likely
that plaintiff would have no further evidence to offer against defendant
if it had not been, in fact, defendant's bus than if it had been. Bayes'
Theorem would then support a conclusion that the probability that it
enough to survive a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict. This circularity is probably
more theoretical than real, however. The plaintiff would normally decide how much evidence to
collect and bring to trial based on her concerns about what counterevidence the defendant might
offer and not just on her desire to meet the minimum standard required to survive a motion for a
directed verdict.
57. Bayes' Theorem is by now no stranger to legal literature. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 19,
at 106-08; Tribe, supra note 9, at 1352. The Tribe article is part of a running debate. touched off
by Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Ident!fication Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489
(1970), on whether Bayes' Theorem should actually be used by the jury to interpret the accumulated effect of all of the evidence before it. See Kaye, supra note II, at 34 nn.5 & 6.
The purpose in introducing Bayes' Theorem here is only to emphasize the fact that efforts to
combine purely statistical evidence offered at trial with other information available to the jury are
not at all inconsistent with probability theory, but may in fact be well explained by its techniques.
Before setting forth Bayes' Theorem, conditional probabilities should be defined. The conditional probability of X given E, written P(X/E), is simply the probability that X will be true given
that E is already known to be true. Thus, the probability that a fair die will tum up a four given
that it turns up an even number of dots is one-third. The probability that the die will tum up a
four given that it turns up an odd number of dots is, of course, zero.
Let X be a proposition and E a piece of information which mayor may not be relevant to it.
Then Bayes' Theorem, in one of its many forms, says
P(X)
P(E/X)
P(X/E)
P(not X) P(E/not X)
P(not X/E)
The ratio P(X)/p(not X) is called the "prior odds" of X. that is, the odds that X is true
considered before any knowledge of E. The ratio P(X/E)/p(not X/E) is called the "posterior
odds" ofX. It represents the revised estimate of the odds of X being true once it is known that E is
true.
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was defendant's bus would only be .4, which would be insufficient to
satisfy the plaintiffs burden. 58
Of course, if the plaintiff could give a "satisfactory explanation" of
why she was unable to produce additional individualistic evidence, the
initial high probability would not be changed and plaintiff would have
met her burden, at least in the sense of establishing a case which the
defendant would then have had to meet with evidence of its own.
Tribe agrees with this statement, but would depart from the strictly
probabilistic model in the case where the initial background
probability is so great or the inference to be drawn from the lack of
other evidence is so relatively weak that the fact of the nonproduction
of other evidence would not plunge the overall estimate below .5. 59
Even if the defendant company were shown to own ninety-nine percent
of all buses running down Main Street, Tribe argues that this fact
alone, absent "satisfactory explanation" of the absence of other proof,
should as a matter of law never be sufficient to shift the burden of coming forward with evidence on the issue of identity to the defendant. 60
He argues that whether or not the subjective probability that it was the
defendant's bus remains above .5,
absent satisfactory explanation, there are compelling reasons
of policy to treat the subjective probability as less than .5-or
simply as insufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff. To
give less force to the plaintiffs evidentiary omission would
eliminate any incentive for plaintiffs to do more than establish
the background statistics. The upshot would be a regime in
which the company owning four-fifths of the blue buses, however careful, would have to pay for five-fifths of all unexplained blue bus accidents-a result as inefficient as it is
unfair.61
58. Using the formula given supra, note 57, X represents the fact that it was defendant's bus
that caused the accident. E represents the information that no other evidence besides background
statistical evidence was offered by the plaintiff. The statement in the text is then equivalent to
80 1
40
-.-=-

20 6
60
59. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1361.
60. Id. at 1349.
61. Id. at 1349-50 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Tribe makes essentially the same
point in an earlier footnote.
[C]ases like Smith are entirely sensible if understood. . . as insisting on the presentation
of some non-statistical and "individualized" proof of identity before compelling a part>,
to pay damages, and even before compelling him to come forward with defensive eVIdence, absent an adequate explanation of the failure to present such individualized
proof.
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The reasons offered by Tribe in support of his position are far
from convincing. The argument that any incentive for the plaintiff to
present less evidence than she maximally might could be extended to
any case where a plaintiff has initially satisfied her burden of production by creating a subjective probability of greater than .5, but where
another individual might desire, for some other reasons, to view more
evidence. Tribe apparently would always prefer to be exposed to more
evidence in such a case, but he provides no convincing argument that
the case where the plaintiff uses only one particular type of evidence is
analytically different, other than that he responds to it differently.
Beyond this point, one should recall that the main incentive that a
plaintiff will have to present any evidence available will be her concern
that the defendant, once allowed to offer evidence, will produce information tending to weaken the plaintiffs case. Tribe seems to suggest
that admitting that the plaintiff can meet her burden of production by
probability evidence alone is equivalent to handing her a victory. But
the defendant will have something to say about that; he will usually be
able to offer evidence tending to show that his bus was not involved, if
that is the case. If the concern is primarily that incentives exist for the
production of relevant evidence, it should be remembered that such
incentives can affect the defendant as well as the plaintiff. If the plaintiff could show in her case that, for example, ninety-nine percent of all
buses were owned by the defendant, might it not make most sense to
shift to the defendant the incentive to come forward with more information? To act otherwise seems to simply create a disincentive for the
defendant to undertake steps to investigate the accident.
Of course, there may be a number of instances when no more information will be available to either party no matter how hard each
would try. For example, recall the still unanswered question of how
Upham Sargent died in the woods. 62 In relation to such cases, Tribe's
Id. at 1341 n.37 (emphasis in original).
It has been pointed out that information does not really come in two qualitatively distinct
categories, "statistical" and "individualized." Saks & Kidd, supra note 53, at 151-54. Tribe is
aware of this, but still finds the fact that people tend to believe there is a distinction important.
I am, of course, aware that all factual evidence is ultimately "statistical," and all
legal proof ultimately "probabilistic," in the epistemological sense that no conclusion
can ever be drawn from empirical data without some step of inductive inference--even if
only an inference that things are usually what they are perceived to be . . . . My concern, however, is only with types of evidence and modes of proof that bring this probabilistic element of inference to explicit attention in a quantified way.
Tribe, supra note 9, at 1330 n.2 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
62. Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 307 Mass. 246, 29 N.E.2d 825 (1940). See supra
notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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analysis expresses doubts about allowing the plaintiff in any such case
to prevail, saying it would be "inefficient" as well as "unfair" to make
the defendant company pay for all such accidents no matter how carefu1 its drivers have been. This statement is conclusory and highly questionable. Tribe enters into no efficiency-type analysis of the problem,
nor will this Article. Still, it seems fair to ask why it would not be even
less efficient to have a ru1e that allows the company to pay for none of
the accidents caused by unidentified buses on Main Street no matter
how much it uses the road nor how carelessly its drivers behave simply
because in some instances particular buses are impossible to identify.
Further, although it may seem unfair that a company should be
forced to pay for an accident it had nothing to do with, the possibility
of such unfairness arises every time a case is decided under conditions
of uncertainty. Does Tribe mean to suggest that there is nothing even
arguably unfair in a ru1e allowing the company to avoid responsibility
for those accidents it did cause and therefore leaving accident victims
without compensation? It is possible, as Tribe argues, that issues of
efficiency and fairness might ultimately support his position; however,
it must be recognized that these issues are far more difficult than he
acknowledges.
Perhaps the reason Tribe's arguments on this point appear so casual and weak-willed is that the principal thrust of his critique of mathematics in the courtroom, at least in the private law context, is a concern
with the general impression which is created in the community by proceeding in this fashion as opposed to the particular results from its use
in a given case. Whether or not it is "unfair" in some deeper sense to
make the company pay even though no fault has been shown, the system would appear unfair, uncaring, and maybe even foolish if a defendant were made to pay for an accident with which he had been in no
way connected by the kind of evidence normally expected. In a portion
of the article, captioned "The Dehumanization of Justice," Tribe eloquently advances his belief in the importance of trial as ritual.
Methods of proof that impose moral blame or authorize official sanctions on the basis of evidence that fails to penetrate
or convince the untutored contemporary intuition threaten to
make the legal system seem even more alien and inhuman
than it already does to distressingly many. There is at stake
not only the further weakening of the confidence of the parties and oftheir willingness to abide by the result, but also the
further erosion of the public's sense that the law's fact-finding
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apparatus is functioning in a somewhat comprehensible way,
on the basis of evidence that speaks, at least in general terms,
to the larger community that the processes of adjudication
must ultimately serve. The need now is to enhance community comprehension of the trial process, not to exacerbate an
already serious problem by shrouding the process in mathematical obscurity.
One element, at least, of that ritual of conflict-settlement
is the presence and functioning of the jury-a cumbersome
and imperfect institution, to be sure, but an institution well
calculated, at least potentially, to mediate between "the law"
in the abstract and the human needs of those affected by it.
Guided and perhaps intimidated by the seeming inexorability
of numbers, induced by the persuasive force of formulas and
the precision of decimal points to perceive themselves as performing a largely mechanical and automatic role, few jurors-whether in criminal cases or in civil-could be relied
upon to recall, let alone to perform, this humanizing function,
to employ their intuition and their sense of community values
to shape their ultimate conclusions.
When one remembers these things, one must aclrnowledge that there was a wisdom of sorts even in trial by battlefor at least that mode of ascertaining truth and resolving conflict reflected well the deeply-felt beliefs of the times and
places in which it was practiced. This is something that can
hardly be said of trial by mathematics today.63
An initial observation about this passage is that it appears to contain an
element of inconsistency. Tribe is concerned that jurors will be overly
deferential to mathematical evidence and analysis and, therefore, too
quick to give it credence and to be influenced by it. At the same time,
he asserts that this type of material at trial "fails to penetrate or convince the untutored contemporary intuition."64 If such evidence speaks
so convincingly to the lay juror, why would it not have the same effect
when it becomes known to "the larger community that the process of
adjudication must ultimately serve"?65 Of course, the two situations
may be quite different, but it is not clear that they are and Tribe himself says nothing to support this.
63. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1375-77 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 1376.
65. Id.
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As pointed out earlier, Tribe simply assumes certain facts about
how jurors react to mathematical evidence and his assumptions have
been questioned on the empirical evidence available. He likewise assumes that litigating parties and the general public would have the
same uneasy and distrustful feeling about "trial by mathematics" that
he has. Tribe offers no supportive evidence to demonstrate how the
present trial process creates respect and confidence in its decisions, nor
how a change in the system would create a different community
appreciation.
Commenting on Tribe's argument that one problem with mathematical procedure in the courtroom is that it makes explicit the fact
that the system allows some finite number of erroneous verdicts as the
price paid for other ends,66 psychologists Saks and Kidd remark:
[S]uch a deliberate turning away from reality may serve
neither the law nor the defendant. First of all, the symbolism
is so at variance with the objective reality. . . and the subjective experience of judges and jurors, that this may be one
more of the legal fictions that tend to undermine the law's
own credibility. An institution that would so deliberately ignore real, measurable doubt and assert not that it has made
the best decision it was able to but that it is "certain" it is
correct, is unlikely to keep the masquerade going forever or to
fool everyone. That is the harm that may be done the court. 67
For these authors, the legal system would best find support for its decisions by appearing to operate on the available techniques of what
might be called scientific decisionmaking. 68
In reality, Tribe's arguments about the valuable ritual components
of trial are based not on his knowledge about what the "deeply-felt
beliefs" of our time are, but on his own opinions about what the fundamental beliefs of the society should be at their best. If this is the objec66. Id. at 1372-75.
67. Saks & Kidd, supra note 53, at 156.
68. Consider also the following remark by Tribe in the introduction to his article:
[A]lthough the mathematical or pseudo-mathematical devices which a society embraces
to rationalize its systems for adjudication may be quite comprehensible to a student of
that society's customs and culture, those devices may nonetheless operate to distortand, in some instances, to destroy-important values which that society means to express
or to pursue through the conduct of legal trials.
Tribe, supra note 9, at 1330. Those important values can only be recognized by a student of a
society through a careful and respectful examination of the ways that society goes about its important business. The best datum available is a thorough understanding of the "rationalizations"
which the co=unity does indeed embrace.
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tive in his work, there may be much in it which can be agreed with, but
the exact nature of his propositions should be more clearly spelled out.
In his article, Tribe gives primary attention to the criminal trial
and is explicit about the elements of the ritual with which he is most
deeply concerned. He refers to the presumption of innocence, the
rights to counsel and confrontation, and the privilege against self-incrimination as "the principles [the community] holds important."69 It
is clear, however, that he believes these to be principles that the community should hold in high regard. Consider how he would respond to
an observation, which might be made, that the majority of the population has lost respect for the criminal justice system because its insistence on these principles seems to result in letting criminals escape
penalties because of technicalities. The legal system should, of course,
acknowledge and show respect for the "deeply-felt beliefs" of the society of which it is a part, but it must also recognize that by its processes
it can affect those beliefs for good or for worse. As Tribe remarks,
there may indeed have been a "wisdom of sorts"70 even in trial by battle in its time, but even so, the legal system of that time, and in particular legal scholars, would have been obliged to seek out improved
methods and to make them available and understandable to the public.
Do scholars now investigating the use of formal decision theory,
mathematics and statistics, as these apply to the preponderance of evidence standard and to other questions in procedure, have a better way?
Only time will say. For the present, it should be stressed that advancing these ideas does not necessarily, as Tribe seems to feel, ignore the
variety of complex and competing values which a trial serves in our
society. Instead, such thinking emphasizes a different "ritualistic" perspective than Tribe does, but an important one nevertheless. There is
value, of course, in the trial process retaining ''human'' qualities and
dimensions. But, there is value as well in the legal system's being
viewed as concerned about its errors and receptive to available resources which may serve, consistent with other important principles, to
lessen those errors.71
69. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1391-92.
70. Id. at 1392.
71. An interesting question for the present generation oflawyers which illustrates this tension
between "precision and ritual" is how we should respond to the increasing amount of empirical
evidence regarding the lack of accuracy of eyewitness testimony. We have long recognized that
courts are particularly comfortable permitting findings to be based on such testimony even though
we may feel it is no more probative than "statistical" evidence. which is not as well received. H.
HART & J. McNAUGHTON, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW 54-55 (1958). It also seems
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"EQUALIZING" ERRORS

Professor Tribe criticizes those who would inject mathematics into
the trial process, because he finds them concerned with only one criterion of decisionmaking, the minimization of the absolute number of
erroneous decisions, to the exclusion of other less objective criteria.
Yet one of the writers most responsible for the increasing interest in
"trial by mathematics," Professor Finkelstein, was the one to bring forward a very different objective than minimization of errors. He suggests that "trial by mathematics" gives support to Tribe's insistence on
the need for particularized evidence in cases where background statistics have been introduced. Finkelstein points out that the decision rule
which minimizes errors, the rule of .5 or greater, cannot be assumed to
meet one of the possible objectives in that it will not necessarily treat
the parties equally in the sense of distributing the expected errors
evenly between the plaintiff and the defendant. 72 This is certainly not
an intuitively easy conclusion to appreciate, and both Finkelstein and
Professor Kaye, in his review of this argument,73 offer lengthy numerical examples to make the point.
This Article does not attempt to duplicate such proofs but only to
give a characterization of the results. In the hypothesized situation, a
value P(X) has been assigned, based on many trials, corresponding to
the degree of belief held in the plaintiffs assertion X after all the evidence has been given. There is, thus, a large collection of values of
P(X), ranging from zero to one. There is no reason to think these values would be evenly distributed. Suppose, for example, that in a large
majority of the cases, the plaintiffs case had been very convincing; that
is, the various values of P(X), while they ranged all over the spectrum,
were most often found on the high side, say in the range of .6 to .8. In
deciding what value of P(X) to choose to minimize errors, the greater
than .5 rule is still the answer. Under this rule, of course, more verdicts
that court decisions based on such identification testimony are among those most representative of
the "ritual" elements of trial which Tribe stresses.
In recent years, however, we have been made distressingly aware of how often such eyewitness testimony is mistaken and how it is much less reliable than it is generally perceived to be.
See E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979). The ''untutored contemporary intuition" may
have great respect for and faith in the reliance on such testimony at trial, but the scientific findings
of inaccuracy and misuse cannot be ignored. Surely, the law must respond to this new information by attempting to take measures designed for greater precision. For further discussion, see
Weinstein, Book Review, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1981) (reviewing E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979».
72. M. FINKELSTEIN, SIIpra note 10, at 67-68.
73. Kaye, SIIpra note 18.
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for plaintiffs than defendants result, but this presents no problem.
Plaintiffs on the whole were presenting stronger cases. Additionally,
however, the expected number of errors favoring plaintiffs will be far
higher than the expected number of errors favoring defendants.
In the example given by Kaye,74 for instance, the .5 decision rule
yields twenty-nine expected erroneous verdicts for plaintiffs and only
eight expected errors in favor of defendants. Thus, the .5 rule produced
an expected number of errors totaling thirty-seven. In this example, if
the court decided on a rule awarding a verdict to plaintiff only if P(X)
were greater than .65, twenty errors could be expected to favor defendants and twenty-one to favor plaintiffs. The higher burden of persuasion has increased the "equality" of the procedure in some sense, but at
the price of creating a greater number of expected errors.
Finkelstein argues that the equalization of errors as a distinct goal
may influence the interpretation of the preponderance standard:
[T]he maximization of correct results is a strong policy, but
one not invariably to be preferred when others conflict with
it. . . . Whether equalization of errors is the goal in any
given context ought to depend on the extent to which total
error would be increased by the pursuit of the equality, the
degree of inequality if minimum error is achieved, and the
relative importance of the competing policies.7s
But how to take account of this equalization policy when the particular
rule which would equalize errors would be, as Finkelstein admits, "unknown and in most cases unknowable"?76 He suggests that while it
may not be possible to fashion an "equalizing" rule directly, this goal is
furthered by an approach to the preponderance standard such as in the
Sargent opinion and in Tribe's analysis:
[I]nsistence on particular evidence should be regarded not
only as a way of reducing total error, but more significantly,
as a way of distributing error more equally between plaintiffs
and defendants over some assumed class of cases with a common subject matter. The insistence of the Sargent court on
such evidence may be taken as an indication that both these
purposes are condensed in the standard of proof by a preponderance of evidence.77
74. Id. at 604-07. This example yielded a total of 130 decisions for plaintiffs and only 18 for
defendants. Id. at 604.
75. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, at 69.
76. Id. at 73.
77. Id. at 78. See id. at 69.
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Professor Kaye has pointed out the error in this argument. 78 Both his
and Finkelstein's numerical examples of the equalization test result in
the plaintiff establishing a probability substantially in excess of .5, but
this is only because of the distribution of the numbers P(X) used as an
example. If the distribution of P(X) were different, so that it leaned
more towards lower values, the test would call for a decision in favor of
the plaintiff when P(X) was lower than.5. This is surely not what the
Sargent opinion, Tribe, or anyone else has in mind.
Kaye, in going beyond this observation, questions the value of this
type of "equalization":
Mistakes do not cancel one another out: it is no solace to the
defendant who should have prevailed but did not that somewhere there is or will be a similarly affected plaintiff. Unless
plaintiffs and defendants are different sorts of people such
that defendants deserved to be favored, I cannot imagine why
we should seek this sort of "equality.,,79
Kaye additionally argues that the greater than .5 rule itself "incorporaters] the only meaningful principle of equality between plaintiffs and
defendants,"80 in that its derivation followed from the assumption of
equality of the disutility of all errors whether they go against one party
or the other.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This discussion of the distribution of expected errors serves principally to remind us of how little we know and can ever hope to know
about the ultimate wisdom of our decisions. We expect there will be
errors, but in general we will never discover which decisions are our
mistakes, nor will we know the actual level or distribution of the errors.
Against such uncertainty the preponderance of the evidence standard
seems a puny tool indeed. It is no wonder that writers would want to
see it as stronger than it is or to improve upon it if they could. But the
uncertainty about everything except that there will be errors remains
undiminished. If anything, it grows the more closely we observe it,
much to our displeasure. The interpretation of the preponderance standard as a preponderance of probabilities rule, calling only for a subjective probability of anything greater than .5, seems in this light to offer
78. Kaye, supra note 18, at 607.
79. fd.
80. fd. at 608. Kaye even suggests a third possible meaning of "equality," in that we could

ask that the proportion of verdicts for each party which are erroneous be equal. Id. at 606 n.2I.
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more than might first have been imagined. It is a crude standard by
any measure, but it offers us something which can be of great value, the
expectation of the minimal number of errors in decisions. In and of
itself, the choice of this rule and the enunciation of this as a goal may
have great "ritualistic" value of the type Professor Tribe cautions us to
consider. Trying to be right as often as possible may be the best we can
do. 81
81. Forthright consideration of the risks of error inherent in the trial process as a way of
approaching questions of burden of proof has recently received support from the United States
Supreme Court. See Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979).

